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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
pared by Chief Justice Taney just before his death, printed in 117 U. S. 697)
there was no possibility of the court's rendering a final judgment. These
and other similar cases are distinguished, and the nature of a declaratory
judgment admirably contrasted in In Re Kariher's Petition (1925) 284 Pa.
455, 131 Atl. 265. The declaratory judgment is merely a remedial change,
a variation in the procedure by which a party may protect a valuable legal
right. The court must be "satisfied that an actual controversy, or the
ripening seeds of one, exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris
and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be of practical help
in ending the controversy." If these elements are not present, the court will
refuse jurisdiction on grounds independent of the nature of declaratory
judgments.
It is gratifying that the Supreme Court at the first time it was called upon
to squarely face the issue in an actual decision recognized the true significance
of the declaratory judgment and distinguished its ill-considered dicta of
previous cases. Such a position has long been urged. See Borchard, The
Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, supra. S. M. R., '33.
FIXTURES-RIGHT OF REMOVAL By REMOTE ASSIGNEE DESPITE CONTRACT
OF VENDOIL.-Plaintiff agreed to sell a tract of land to S. under an executory
contract of sale, retaining title until all installments were paid. The con-
tract provided that upon a breach by S., plaintiff should have the right of
immediate possession, together with all improvements. Defendant was a
tenant of J., a remote assignee of S.'s rights under the contract. Under his
contract with J. defendant had the right to remove the improvements in
question, which were of a permanent nature. Upon plaintiff's asserting his
right of reentry, the court granted an injunction preventing defendant from
removing certain improvements placed by him on the land. Willard v.
Geary (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 53 S. W. (2d) 489.
It is clear that even without an agreement, if the improvements had been
made either by S. or by J. the right of removal would have been lost, for
buildings and other fixtures erected by one in possession of land under a
contract of purchase become a part of the realty. 1 Thompson, Real Prop-
erty 206. The purchaser in such a case stands in a position analagous to
that of a mortgagor, and has no greater rights of removal than the mortgagor
has as against the mortgagee. 26 C. J. 675.
But the problem here is not so simple. It obviously involves a conflict of
interests, calling for a balancing of equities. There seem to be no other
reported cases precisely in point; but workable analogies are more
abundant.
In Harris v. Hackley (1901) 127 Mich. 46, 86 N. W. 389, a conditional
seller of fixtures to the vendee of land was granted recovery against the
vendor of the land holding title, in spite of an agreement between the vendor
and vendee of the land that the former should get all improvements. The
court held that the agreement between the vendee and the conditional seller
-kept the property personalty even though the vendee might have intended it
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to become a permanent part of the realty. This case has been followed by
a more recent decision, Otis Elevator Co. v. DeVos (1927) 240 Mich. 413, 215
N. W. 343, which establishes the general rule that the rights of a seller of
fixtures will prevail as against the lien of the vendor of realty to which they
have been attached. Hendy v. Dinkerhoff (1880) 57 Cal. 3; note (1921) 13
A. L. R. 457.
But in Des Moines Improvement Co. v. Holland Furnace Co. (1927) 204
Iowa 274, 212 N. W. 551, where a purchaser in possession, under an agree-
ment with the vendor of the land that all improvements should remain there-
on, contracted with the vendor of a furnace that the title should remain in
the latter until the price was paid, the court gave a verdiet for the vendor of
the land when the furnace, once permanently attached, was removed from the
premises after the purchaser defaulted to both parties.
Similar cases arising where the original relationship is that of mortgagor-
mortgagee rather than vendor-vendee merely add to the existing conflict.
But inasmuch as one holding a vendor's lien has a legal position similar to
that of a mortgagee, and the cases do not attempt to distinguish between
those instances where the vendor retains title and those where he merely
has a lien, the analogy is pertinent. The decisions support a majority view
that if the mortgagor of land leases it to a third person and gives him the
right to remove improvements, such chattels do not become subject to the
mortgage if they can be removed without damage to the realty. Note (1926)
41 A. L. R. 616. But again there are contrary holdings.
The subsequent attachor of chattels is favored in Belvin v. Raleigh Paper
Co. (1898) 123 N. C. 138, 31 S. E. 655; Broadus v. Smith (1899) 121 Ala.
335, 26 So. 34, and Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Hukill (1912) 10
Del. Ch. 88, 85 Atl. 60. The Delaware case bases the question of removal on
the permanency of the improvements, or the intent of the parties, reasoning
that when there is an agreement with the tenant for removal, the improve-
ment was not intended to be a permanent one. The court in Belvin v.
Raleigh Paper Co. also argues that since the improvements never belonged
to the mortgagor there is no reason why the mortgagee should have them.
And the Alabama case reaches the same decision with the reservation that
the mortgagor or tenant may not do anything to impair the security of the
mortgagee.
The contrary view, known as the Massachusetts rule, laid down in Clary
v. Owen (Mass. 1860) 15 Gray 522, has also met with approval in Maine,
Eketrom v. Hall (1897) 90 Me. 186, 38 Atl. 106, and Georgia, Cunningham
v. Cureton (1895) 96 Ga. 489, 23 S. E. 420. In the Georgia case the rule was
applied to those fixtures placed in a building to carry out the obvious purpose
for which it was erected or permanently to increase its value for occupation
or use.
Logically, one holding under a mortgagor or vendee in possession should
have no greater rights than the mortgagor or vendee himself, and therefore
any fixtures should remain with the land. But it is hardly just to enhance
the security of the mortgagee or vendor at the expense of an innocent third
party who has done everything possible to protect himself.
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The various decisions are of course influenced by elements not brought
out in the principal case. There is nothing in the Texas opinion which indi-
cates the type of improvements in question other than that they were "per-
manent in their nature", nor is there anything to indicate that the realty
would be in any way damaged by their removal. Barring these factors, the
case seems to reach a logical rather than an equitable result. I. J. W., '35.
LIENS-EXTENSION TO COVER THE EXPENSE OF ENFORCING.-Defendant ga-
rage keeper, having a statutory lien on plaintiff's cars, hired a sheriff to take
possession of them. His fee was $10 per car. Plaintiff sued to replevy the
cars, but refused to pay the sheriff's fees. Section 2 of the Garage Keeper's
Lien Act, C. S. N. J. (Supp. 1931), secs. 135-46 to 135-148 stated, "The person
having the said lien may, without further process of law, . . . seize the
motor vehicle . . .; provided, however, that such seizure can be made with-
out use of force and in a peaceable manner." Section 1 of the same act defined
the lien as "for the sum due for such storing, maintaining, keeping, or repair-
ing of such motor vehicle or other supplies therefor." Held, since no mention
was made in the statute of seizure by sheriffs or of the expense of recaption,
thd lien did not cover the sheriff's fee. "The legislative intent . . . is to give
the garage keeper special remedy which may be pursued immediately and
without delay, cost, or resort to the courts, and nothing can be read into the
statute which is not already there in definite terms." Keshen v. Olsan (1932)
.10 N. J. Misc. 1301, 163 Atl. 280.
The case raises the interesting question of whether a garage keeper may
extend his lien to cover costs which he might incur in retaking the car him-
self. "A person who has a lien upon a chattel cannot add to the amount a
charge for keeping the chattel till the debt is paid; that is, in truth, a charge
for keeping it for his own benefit, not for the benefit of the owner of the chat-
tel. . . The right of detaining goods on which there is a lien is a remedy
to be enforced by the act of the party who claims the lien, and having such
remedy, he is not generally at common law allowed the costs of enforcing it."
1 Jones, Liens (3d ed. 1914) 972. See also Somes v. British Empire Shipping
Co. (1860) 8 H. L. Cas. 338, 11 Eng. Repr. 459. In a later case it was held
that a master has no lien for demurrage occasioned by his own refusal to de-
liver even when such refusal is for the purpose of preserving his lien for other
charges. Miedbrodt v. Fitzsimon, The Energie (1875) L. R. 6 P. C. 306.
In Canada the ruling of Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co., supra, was
applied in Pease v. Johnston et al. (1905) 7 Terr. L. R. 416, 1 W. L. R. 208,
where it was held that a vendor of chattels under a lien note who has retaken
possession in accordance with the note is not entitled to add to the charge
against the chattels the expense of keeping them after seizure. The rule was
again applied in Canada Steel and Wire Co. v. Ferguson (1915) 25 Man. L. R.
3201, 8 W. W. R. 416, 21 D. L. R. 771.
In the United States the leading case of Devereaux v. Fleming (C. C.
S. C., 1892) 53 Fed. 401 was differentiated from Somes v. Shipping Co., supra,
the court holding that when the contract is one of storage and the contract is
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